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IN THE. SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
WALTER F. ~I ORGAN, I-IAROLD T.
MORGAN, GE·ORGE CROMAR, LESLIE
CROMAR, WILLIAM CROMAR,
EUGENE CR0~1:AR, and ARLENE
CRO~!AR GEAR,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
-vs.BERT SORENSON, DICK WIND, MRS.
BERT SORENSON, and MRS. DICK
WIND,
D·efend.ants and Appellants,
-ANDVERRUE THEOBALD, Ad1ninistrator of
the Estate of James T. Morgan, Deceased;
VERRUE THE·OBALD, Administrator of
the estate of Frank A. Cromar, Deceased;
Mrs. Frank Cromar, whose true and correct
name is otherwise unknown; JOHN BARNARD, and HAROLD EVANS.,
Cross-Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.

8153

BRIE:B""f OF' R.ESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF· CASE
This action was begun by the named plaintiffs upon
an ordinary complaint to quiet title to the Black Jack
1
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Lode Mining Claims numbered 1 to 5 inclusive, situated
in Erickson Mining District, Juab County, Utah, against
the named defendants. Paragraph 1 of the complaint (R.
______ ) alleges :
"That the plaintiffs Walter F. Morgan and
Harold T. Morgan are the only surviving heirs at
law of James Morgan, also known as James T.
Morgan, deceased; and that plaintiffs George
Cromar, Leslie Cromar, William Cromar, Eugene
Cromar and Arlene ·Cro1nar Gear are the only surviving heirs at law of F. A. Cromar, decea'Sed."
Defendants came into court with a motion for extension of time in which to answer (R. ______ ) supported by
an affidavit (R. ______ ) in which it is alleged:
"That more particularly the affiant herein
(Eldon A. Eliason) herein has been unable to find
any record, after careful search, of the appointment of an administrator or executor in either the
estate of James T. Morgan or F. A. Cromar, both
deceased, and both original locators on whom the
plaintiffs make their P'Urported claim. That there
is no record of conveyances before death which
would divest these individuals, their heirs or
creditors of interest in the mining property described in the complaint. There is no order establish heirship of either of the deceased locators."
The order was granted, and some time after which
the named defendants filed their Answer and CrossComplaint wherein they allege: (R. ------)
"1. That Verrue Theobald is the duly appointed, qualified and acting administrator of the

2
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estate of James Morgan, also known as James T.
Morgan, deceased.
"2. That Verrue Theobald is the duly appointed, qualified and acting administrator of the
estate of F. A. Cromar, also known as F'rank
Ctomar, or Frank A. Cromar, deceased."
And in which cross-complaint defendants claim to be
owners of the Black Queen Lode Mining Claims numbered
1 to 5, inclusive, and Johnny Boy claim, which claims
covered approximately the same area covered by the
Black Jack Claims, and allege that the Black Jack Claims
were by the plaintiffs and their grantors and locators
abandoned and forfeited prior to the location by the defendants; and that the required labor and improvements
were not performed upon the Black Jack Claims for any
year since 1948. (R. ______ ) And also say that Verrue
Theobald as such administrators, are parties who have,
or may have some right title or interest in and to said
mining property, etc.
Pursuant to a pre-trial a Pre-trial Order was made
in which the premises on which the issues herein are
stated as follows : ( R. ------)
"4. The plaintiffs claim that said Black Jack
locations were valid and subsisting locations at
the time of the attempted location of said mining
ground by the defendants, and claim tha.t assessment work upon said Black Jack claims was made
for the assessment year ending July 1, 1950.
"5. The plaintiffs claim that the mining
ground embraced in the mining ·claims under
3
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which the defendants clailn, to wit: Black Queens
... and Johnny Boy, was not open to location at
the time of location by the defendants, and that
each and all of said claims are invalid.
"6. The defendants and cross-complainants
claim that the plaintiffs and their predecessors
have failed to do any assessment work upon the
Black Jack elalins at any time since the year 1949,
and that the ground embraced in the Black Jack
Claims was therefore open to relocation at the
time of defendants claims, to wit June 21, 1951."
Upon the iS'sues arising from such premises the parties went to trial, P. N. Anderson appearing for the plaintiffs and cross-defendants Verrue Theobald, administrator of the estate of James Morgan, deceased and Verrue
Theobald, administrator of the estate of F·rank Cromar
deceased. (R. ______ ) Default of defendants Harold Evans
and John Barnard was entered. (Tr. 2)
In order to more eoncisely and clearly argue our position we deem it ne'Cessary to make a ~tatement of facts
and set forth substantial parts of the evidence which
support the Findings of Facts made by the Trial Court.
STATEMENT OF F'ACTS
Walter F·. Morgan and Harold T. Morgan are sons
of the late James Morgan or James T. Morgan and the
named Cromars plaintiffs were the only surviving heirs
at law of Frank Cromar. (Tr. 2-3-4) Amended locations
for Black J'ack Claims 1 to 5 inclusive (Ex. 2 to 6) were
4
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n1ade in 19·30 by Jrunes Morgan and ] rank Cromar, and
the location notices for claims 1 to 4 inclusive were prepared by Arthur A. Miller, a 1nineral survey.or, and wh'ich
depict how the claims -vvere staked and marked with 4" by
4" corner posts. Over the course of the ensuing years the
clai1ns were worked and held by said Morgan and Cromar. One, D. H. Evans, performed work and improvements under a lease (Ex. 9; Tr. 223) upon the Black Jack
claims, which provided that he should so do. (Par. 5)
1

On April 10, 1949, Jan1es 1\forgan executed and delivered a quit claim deed (which was not recorded until
in 1951, Ex. 7; Tr. 2) to his aforenamed sons; but continued his efforts upon the claims until the month he
died, November 26, 1949. On July 8th, 1949 he made as
co-owner and had recorded a notice of intention to hold
under the Congressional Act Public Law 107. (Ex. 8; Tr.
222) That the plaintiffs claimed the benefit of that Act
and to have the work and improvements made upon said
claims between July 1, 1948 and July 1, 1949, credited
upon and for the assessment year July 1, 1949 and JUly
1, 1950. (Tr. 229-294-295)
WALTER F. MORGAN testified:
"Q. What comment was made by your father at
the time he gave this (deed) to you~
A. His exact words I don't remember, but he just
wanted us to have all of his personal holdings
because he was getting old."
The consideration was only one dollar. James Morgan
died November 26, 1949.
5
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0. H. EVANS, for plaintiff, testified: He had a
lease on the Black Jack claims dated May, 1948 (Ex. 9;
Tr. 223-224) That between July 1, 1948 and July 1, 1949,
he did work and made improvements upon the claims,
particularly he sank a winze at the end of the tunnel fro~
a depth of 20 feet to 70 feet, ap·proxirnately 50 feet. About
$6000.00 wa:s 'spent by Evans and associates under the
lease. (Tr. 225 to 229) He mined and shipped some commercial ore; about 8 inches of high grade lead-zinc ore
in bottom 'Of winze. Fighting vvater made for big cost in
op,eration; it comes up from every direction; have to keep
it pump:ted dovvn. (Tr. 230-231) Ernest P. Lancaster
and others were employed in the work July 1948 to July
1, 1949. (Tr. 234) The water raised about 2 feet per
minute, 48-49 wet winter. (Tr. 242) The ground upon
which pump·ed water is delivered is gravel and shale;
water sinks in; no chance t'O spread out fron1 ravine; no
mud-'Sinks right in. Water pumped from winze to level
of tunnel and runs out through tunnel-not piped. (Tr.
251-252).
He and others did work on claims about July 7 to
16th, 1949 in Tunnel on Black J'ack No. 1 (This is the
main tunnel) Three men helped. Pumped out winze at end
of tunnel; installed stalls, sills, and head boards to hold
ground in case of future operations. Five days of 24
hours for pumping and 1 day timbering between 50 feet
and 70 feet down winze. Most of timbers were obtained
from James Morgan, who had quite a lot. Retail price
6
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would be quite high. Purchased gasoline, one check
$98.38. Work required 36-8 hour shifts, at standard
miners' wages of $10.85 per shift. (Tr. 225-228)
Thirty-six 8 hour shifts at $10.85 per shift is $390.60;
gasoline $98.38, and while we find no price on timbers
they "\vould con1e quite high and at least $11.02; making a
total of $500.00 within the assessment year July 1, 1949
and July 1, 1950. (Tr. 226-228)
ERNEST P. LANCASTER, for plaintiffs, testified:
He worked with others for Evans between July 1, 1948
and July 1st, 1949 on Black Jack claims, back in winze
at end of main tunnel; water in winze, ch.ased him out
several times in 48-49; work-sinking winze, skidding and
tramming waste, timbering and blasting. ( Tr. 272-273)
Around middle of July, 1949, sawed timbers for use in
Black Jacks. (Tr. 274) lie and all went down (from the
mines) for the 4th of July. ( Tr. 281)
VICTOR BRAY, for plaintiffs, testified: Was acquainted with James 1forgan, who died latter part of November, 1949. Knew the Black Jack claims. Went with
Morgan on claims the first time the latter part of July,
1949; again about 1niddle of September, and again the
first part of November, 1949. Stayed three days each
time. They cleaned around track and dug ditches for
drainage for winze inside tunnel. (Tr. 253-55-57) Morgan
was not a very well man. (Tr. 258) Water was running
out of mouth of tunnel; it showed that there had been

7
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more water than there was running out, because water
had run over the track (in tunnel). ( Tr. 258-260) Settlement for time-Morgan called it even on account owing
him by Bray for loans, and paid Bray $30.00 ca.sh. (Tr.
255)
RAY SPAR, for defendant, testified: Considered
himself a mining engineer, and had in December 1941,
gone on the Black Jack property with James Morgan who
. pointed out to Spar the working (tunnel) and S.par learned of the shaft and "\Vater at end of tunnel, and became
interested in property. Went on pToperty three times
in Dec. 1941 and Feb. 1942. (Tr. 142) The next time Spar
went on Black J a'Cks in 1945 and then in 1949; and in in. terirn a new winze had been sunk, he observed on July
3rd 1949. Morgan told him in 19-41 good ore was in tpe
bottom-62o/o lead. He saw ore in bin. (T·r. 145-146-176)
Morgan told me it came out of the winze. (Tr. 174) Morgan pointed out markers to him and said property had
been surveyed. (Tr. 185) The road up to tunnel was same
July 3, 1949 as "\Vhen he first went up with Morgan, no
change. (Tr. 147) In 1945 Morgan had ore in bin, Spar
observed. (Tr. 149) Spar and sorenS'on had claims located together in the Erickson Topaz District. On the
first trip on Black Jack claims in July 1949 Sorenson
was with him. (Tr. 174-175) Spar went again on claims
First time in July, 1949, water was up to level of
tunnel and running from tunnel; there was ·evidence at
one time previous the water had been pumped out, bu!
8
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how long before he could not say; could see where water
had been running down the hill on the outside, indicating
some activity in way of pumping prior to J'uly, 1949. (Tr.
178-179) As of July 2 or 3, the markings which indicated there probably had been an air compressor 'Set up
beside the tunnel were such to indicate it had probably
been within a month previous to that. (Tr. 199) July 3rd,
194U, he and Sorenson followed the road and walked up.
(Tr. 180) Sorenson never paid Spar for services at any
time and owes Spar nothing. (Tr. 173)
BERT SOR.ENSON heretofore referred to as Sorenson, defendant, testified: First time he was on Black
Jack claims "\Vas about July 3, 1949. (Tr.18) He with Ray
Spar went into tunnel and at end observed a pond of
water and ore showings. Saw other improvements on
claims-a drift on No.5; other workings on No.4 (Tr.
21-233-23) He saw markers 4" by 4" and piles of rock.
(Tr. 25-26) An ore bin had been constructed and a road
made up to the bin. (Tr. 33) He did not remember if water
was running out of tunnel July 3, 1949. (Tr. 116) He
could not say the road up to the tunnel site had not been
used; it was traversible by a touring car; it could have
been used in the past. (Tr. 123-124)
· He went on Black Jack ground July 3, J:uly 20 and
October 10, 1949, to either locate it or lease it. He did
not know who had the claims; did not try to find out; and
did not know the ground was Black Jack claims. He did
not know ore (on ground) had any value. (Tr. 113-114)
9
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And R·ay Spar was with hi1n. (Tr. 20) (See Spar's testiInony in connection herewith) He knew in 1950 by whon1
Black Jack Claims were claimed (Tr. 11-1) but did not attempt to contact clain1ants. (Tr. 115) The Trinnel was
300 feet to 400 feet in length. (Tr. 21) A cabin and the
ore bid is near mouth of tunnel. (Tr. 107) The road goes
up a gulch; up a ridge, turns back down through a s~ale
and stops at cabin. (Tr. 113) Sorenson never paid Spar
for anything; they prospected together here and there.
(Tr. 140)

STATE1iENT OFI POINTS
PoiNT

1.

The evidence is sufficient to sustain the finding that
neither the plaintiffs or their predecess·ors abandoned
or ceased to claim ownership of t~e Black Jack Claims
after

th~

location'S thereof.
POINT

2.

That the evidence is amply sufficient that there was
at least $500.00 worth of labor and imp·rovements performed upon the Black Jack claims between July 1, 1948
and July 1, 1949, for and on account of plaintiffs and predecessors in interest.

10
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POINT 3.
That the evidence fully justified the finding that
the quit-claim deed from James Morgan to his sons wa:s
intended a.s a deed of gift and to take effect upon death
of grantor and that James Morgan had sufficient interest
in the claims to authorize him to effectively make and file
the Intention to hold Mining Claims under Public Law
107 of the 81st Congress as shown by plaintiffs' exhibit

'8'.
PoiNT 4.
That plaintiffs were entitled to invoke the benefit
under said Public Law 107 to have credit for the work
and improvements performed between J u1y 1st, 1948 and
July 1, 1949, applied to and for the assessment year July
1, 1949 to July 1, 1950.
PoiNT 5.
That the issues involved did not require proof of the
required assessment work subsequent to July 1, 1950.

ARGUM·ENT
PoiNT 1.
The amended location notices depict 4" by 4" markers
having been used. Spar said Morgan pointed out corners
and said the claims had been surveyed. After 19 years
Sorenson himself identified some of such markers. The
fact that he could not locate more corners or monuments
than he did is nc evidence of abandonment.
11
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In JUPITER MINING CO. vs. BODIE ~fiNING
COl\IIP ANY, 4 Morrison 1Iining Rep·. ±11, 11 Fed. 666,
one of the oldest leading cases and \vhich has been followed by many others, says:
"After a location has been lawfully made, the
right of the locator cannot be divested by the mere
obliteration of the marks or monuments or removal of the stakes without his fault, he having
performed the other acts required by the Statute."
PoiNT

2.

Defendants' evidence as to the work and improvements on the claims is principally that the witnesses did
not see or observe any, reminding us of the ca.se of
CHAMBERLAIN vs. M·ONTGOMERY, (Utah 1953) 261
Pac. 2nd 942, wherein it appears that the would be claim
jumper hired an engineer to make observations as to any
work that might be performed upon the desired claims,
and who reported and testified that only three days work
had been done within the assessment year, but in which
case it app·ears that the workmen had back filled with
muck after their working p-eriod obstructing from the
view of trespassers the inside working which showed a
good vein of ore. In that case the Court said :
" ... the trial Court's findings that the work
was in fact done during the questioned year,
whether or not it was easily discoverable by appellant, supports the conclusion that the respondents retained their prior claim."
In the case at bar we have the testimony of two dis-

12
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interested witnesses (at the time of trial) who had been
engaged in the vvork of sinking the additional 50 feet of
winze at the end of the main tunnel on Black Jack No. 1,
at a cost of about $6000.00, cost being high because of the
water pumping. One tenth of that figure was sufficient,
and then there vvas additional work done after July 1
1949 to apply for the year July 1, 1949 to July 1, 1950,
with the carry-over under public law 107 Act of Congress.
The track in the tunnel evidently vvas in good shape as
far as any proof to the contrary. The road up to the tunnel was traversible by a touring car. And defendants'
witness Spar testifie·d that on July 3, 1949 there was evidence that water had previously been pumped out, because he could see where water had been running down
the hill on the outside of the tunnel, which indicated some
activity in the way of pumping; and certainly such physical evidence must have been made after the spring thaw.
And he also said that the markings which indicated there
probably had been an air compressor set up beside the
tunnel were such to indicate it had probably been within
a month previous to that-J'uly 3, 1949.
The burden of proof is upon the party alleging that
the work was not done-And the proof should be clear
and convincing.
40 C. J. 845, page 303;
Morrisons Mining Rights (16th Ed.) 130; and
numerous cases.
After reciting the evidence in CHAMBERLAIN vs.

13
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~IONrrGOMERY,

supra, the Court said:

"This certainly was sufficient evidence of the
fact that the work was done and this c·ourt cannot
pass on the credibility of the witnesses before the
lower Court."
That quotation certainly applies in this case with
reference to the countenance and evasiveness of defendant Sorenson when he testified that he did not know ·of the
Black Jack claims or who the holders were July 3, 1949,
when he went with Spar, mining engineer, who knew very
much about the claims, and both were interested in leasing or locating the claims; or when he, Sorenson wa;s
questioned as to the condition of the road to the tunnel,
what he observed at the end of the tunnel, and as to other
workings on the claims which he ap·parently tried to avoid
testifying to. (Tr. 120-122) There can not rationally be
any doubt but \vhat Sorenson, prospecting with Spar, who
knew about the Black Jack claims from Morgan as far
back as 1941 where they were located and had been surveyed, that there was good ore at bottom of winze, saw
ore in bin, and told that Rome weni 62% lead, knew about
these claims and the owners thereof, and conceived a
bright picture ·of becoming the owner rather than lessee
thereof.
"As a general rule of law, forfeitures are not favored." JUPITER MINING CO vs. BODIE MNG. CO.,
sup~ra.

14
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In BETTS vs. STEPIIENSON, 223 Pac. 2nd 651,
(Calif.) it is said:
".1:\ forfeiture of a mining claim for failure to
do the annual work can be established only upon
clear and convincing proof of such failure. (Citing case'S) Every reasonable doubt will be resolved in favor of the validity of a mining claim as
against the assertion of a forfeiture." Citing
Thornton v. Karfman, (Mon.) 106 Pac. 361.

In NEW MERCUR ~ING. CO. vs. SOUTH MERCUR MNG. CO., 102 Utah 131, 128 Pac. 2nd 269, the
Court says:
"Law does not favor forfeitures, and hence
ordinarily the party claiming forfeiture of a title
must plead and establish it by clear and convincing
proof.''
The same rule prevails generally, and in LUCKY 5
MNG. CO vs. CENTRAL IDAH·O PLACE MNG. CO.
(Idaho) 235 Pac. 2nd 319 it i'S held:
"If trial Courts' findings are sustained hy
competent, substantial though conflicting evidence,
they will not be distributed on appeal."
To the same effect is PEASE vs. JOHNSON, ET
AL., (Calif.) 235 Pac. 2nd 229.
That assessment work and improvements might be
made by a lessee i'S not disputed; and so held in NEW
MERCUR MNG. c·o. vs. SOUTI-I MERCUR MNG. CO.,
supra.
The evidence also discloses the work done after
15
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July 1st, 1949, by Evans and others, and Bray and 1\lorgan upon the claims. The work done by Evans \vas done
before he terminated his lease. According to the testimony 36 shifts of 8 hours were put in by Evans and cre\v
in July, 1949, p·umping and timbering in the winze, at
standard n1iners' wages of $10.85 per shift, or $390.00;
gasoline $98.38; and certainly the timbering n1aterial for
which there was no figure given, but would run quite
high, would make up $11.02; making a total of $500.00.
This evidence is not refuted except by testimony of defendants' that they did not observe evidence of it on July
20th, 1949, when Sorenson and Spar went out. But an
examination of their testimony in this case will lend considerable credence to the testimony of plaintiffs' witnesses
It is ·significant that Evans, in July, drained the
winze so he could timber down between the 50 feet and
70 feet depth in case of future operations; and then the
latter part of July Morgan and Bray went out and cleaned up along the track in tunnel and cleaned out the water
drain trench. And for this work Bray received credit in
full for loans theretofore had from Morgan, and was paid
$30.00.
·so aside from the carry-over credit of the previous
year to the assessment year July 1, 1949 to July 1, 1950,
there was the requird amount of work performed in and
for the latter year.
16
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PoiNTs 3.

AND

4.

The findings and conclusions of the Court are fully
supported by the evidence and law as to the deed.
When James Morgan rnade and gave the quit-clairn
deed to his sons, consideration only one dollar, he wanted
them to have his holdings, ~lorgan was getting old, and as
witness Bray stated, Morgan was not a very well man.
Morgan wanted his sons to have his holdings after his
death. This conclusion is fully justified by the fact that
Morgan continue his interest in the claim up until the
first part of the month he died, November 26, 1949. He
wanted to see to it that his sons did receive his holdings
with all the benefits attached thereto; so he made and recorded the notice of intention to hold under Public Law
107, as CO-OWNER. Morgan continued his interest toward work and improvement upon the claims, going upon
the claim at three different times and contributing his
efforts-a man of his advanced years and paying out his
cash. He furnished timber for Evans in July, 1949. No
court or jury could or would hold that Morgan was a
stranger or trespasser upon the claims, if such were an
issue under the state of facts herein. Morgan made and
filed the notice to hold as co-owner. He was a co--owner
with the other owners, a co-tenant. He was a claimant,
as the word is intended to mean as used in Public Law
107. He had an interest in the claims, and his interest
was recognized by the sons in withholding the recording

17
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of the deed until after his death. Regardless of the testimony of Morgan or his claim it is 1nost evident that
James ~forgan did intend to retain control and right of
possession and occupancy of the property after the deed
was made, for that is what he did, and which negative'S
the idea that in legal effeet there 'vas co1nplete delivery
to pass ti tie.
As to the effect of the delivery of the deed it is stated
in 18 C. J. 198, after stating the general rule:
"The question of whether or not there has
been a delivery must therefore be determined upon the facts of each particular case, and although
certain principle's are generally applicable, they do
not furnish conclusive rules under all circumstances.''
Supporting this text is the case of ALW AR·D vs.
L·OBINGIER, 87 Kan. 106, 108, 123 P. 867, holding that"Principles which correctly solve the particular problem presented are sometimes stated in the
form of general rules, which do not admit of universal application."
And in GAYLORD vs. GAYLORD, 150 N.C. 222,63
S.E. 1028, it was held:
"It is a familiar p-rinciple that the question of
the delivery of a deed or other written instrument
is very largely dependent on the intent of the parties at the time and is not at all conclusively established by the manual or physical passing of the
deed from the grantor to the grantee."
18
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The Court in WEIGAND vs. RUTSCHKE, 253 Ill.
260, 97 N.E. 641, held:
"The mere placing of a deed in the hands of
the grantee does not necessarily constitute a delivery. The question is one of intention wh.ether
the deed was then in tended by the parties to take
effect according to its terms."
Incidentally we might quote counsel for defendants
'vhen the deed was offered in Evidence:
"MR. ELIASON: Your Honor, I am going
to object to the receiving of Exhibit 7 on the
ground that it is invalid, there is no proper grantee shown in the instrument, and of course no witnesses shown on the instrument, and I believe that
because of two persons named as grantees, with
the "and" and "or", it doesn't amount to a valid
instrument, and I am going to object to it. MR.
F'INLINS·ON: On the further ground that it
doesn't describe the property in question." (Tr.

10)
Even though the deed was and is invalid and that
there was no complete delivery and transfer of title intended the Morgan plaintiffs succeeded to the interest
of their father upon his death.
The case of JUPITER MNG. CO. vs. BODIE MNG.
CO., supra, was removed from the State Court ( C'alifornia) to the Circuit Court of the United States, where
it was tried by a jury. Action in trespass-in which defendant pleaded title to the locus inquo. The reports of
this case seem to set out the instructions given to the
19·
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jury, but it has been extensively cited and followed as the
law. It is said, as applicable to the case at bar:
"Work done by any of the grantors of defendant while holding the claim, whether holding the
legal or equitable title, during the performance of
the labor or work, is available to preserve the
claim, and no mere relocation for forfeiture, made
before the forfeiture actually attached by actual
default, would be valid to defeat the claim."
And we believe that upon an issue as to the validity of
the deed between the Morgan sons and the estate of
James Morgan, deceased, and based upon the competent
evidence reflected in this case, the Court would hold th'e
title did not pass from James Morgan, and that certainly was the view of Eldon A. Eliason when in the affidavit for extension of time in which to answer he said:
"That ·there is no record of conveyance before death
which would divest these individuals (James T. Morgan
or F. A. Cromar), their heirs or creditors of interest in
the mining prop·erty described in the complaint ... " and
he could find no record of appointment of an adn1inistrator for either of the deceased locators; then proceeded
to have appointments made and the administrators made
parties to this. action.
And thus, the benefit of the extension Act Public
Law 107 would enure to the successors in interest.
POINT

5.

The defendants' locations were attempted in June
20
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1951. The issue involved vvas as to work and irnprovements in and for the years J'uly 1, 1948 to July 1, 1949,
and July 1, 1949 and July 1, 1950. Sufficient work and
improvements having been performed and creditable for
such years made the a tte1npted locations of defendants
premature, ineffective and invalid.
The n1ateriality of work and improve1nents perforine¢1 after July 1, 1950, would go to the point of refuting
the allegations of abandon:inen t of the property; and the
record is clear as to additional work and improvements
done after that date.
CONCLUSION
Surely in a case such as this, when the record reflects
more than 19 years of effort and expenditures by the
locators showing the work and i1nprovements upon the
claims as related in the evidence, and in view of the evidence amply supporting the trial court's findings and
the conclusions being consistent therewith, now, when
there appears prospects for reward to the heirs of the locators, who undoubtedly made sacrifices and contributions in the course of those years, this Court will, in the
spirit of the Courts in the past as expressed in the cited
decisions, affirm the judg1nen t herein; and not reward an
opportunist who went upon the claims the day before the
FOURTH of July, 1949, with one, Spar, who knew the
claimant Morgan and had learned about and locations of
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the claims and their prosp·ective value, ostensibly for the
purpose of leasing but never contacting the owners.
Respectfully sub1nitted,
P. N. ANDERSON &
EKSAYN ANDERS·ON
Attorneys for Respondents
By (S) P. N. ANDERSON
One of counsel.
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